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Sealion Postponed; Hitler and the Inyasion of Britain. 
By the middle ofJune 1940, Gennany reigned supreme throughout Western Europe, the result 
ofa string ofunprecedented political and military successes. On 17 June, the Gennans signed an 
armistice with France at Compiegne, in the same railway car that they had signed the armistice 
that ended the First World War. Considering the war all but won, a jubilant Hitler expectantly 
turned his attention to England, sure that under such circumstances he could reach an agreement 
that would conclude hostilities with Britain and allow him to tum his attention to the East. 
Hitler had every reason to be confident. The rapidity of the Gennan advance into France had 
left the armies opposing them in disarray. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had been forced 
to conduct an emergency evacuation of the continent at Dunkirk, leaving most of its material 
behind. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had suffered heavy casualties in the defense ofFrance before 
withdrawing, leaving the barest minimum number of squadrons believed necessary for the 
protection of the Home Islands. Only the Royal Navy remained relatively unscathed, albeit in a 
defensive posture, as a ready counter-force to Gennan ambition. It is in these circumstances that 
Hitler, expecting them to concede Gennan dominance on the European continent, waited for the 
British to come to their senses with a growing impatience. 
By the beginning of July, several incidents made Hitler realize that England had no intention of 
coming to tenns. On June 18, Churchill had made a speech in the House of Commons, in a tone 
that was anything but conciliatory. On the diplomatic front, several attempts to use Sweden to 
sound out British willingness to discuss the situation proved fruitless. Similar attempts to use the 
Pope to mediate an agreement met with the same results. On July 3rd, the British fleet opened fire 
on the remnants of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir, in effect destroying the navy of a fonner ally 
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rather than see it used against them by the Germans. Convinced by these events, and other 
information supplied to him by German intelligence agencies, on 16 July Hitler issued Fuhrer 
Directive no. 16, ordering preparation for the invasion of England. The directive called for a 
surprise crossing of the Channel on a wide front, with each branch of the armed forces responsible 
for a different aspect of the invasion. The Navy and Luftwaffe were ordered to submit plans"... to 
establish the necessary conditions for crossing the channel" to Hitler as soon as possible. ' 
Some historians question Hitler's motives for ordering the operation. A debate continues on 
what Hitler's intentions actually were, most notably that he never intended to invade in the first 
place. Historians such as David Irving2and Christopher Ray' have suggested that Hitler had only 
one goal in mind, the invasion of the Soviet Union, and followed this direction with a singularity 
of purpose irrespective of his actions vis-a-vis England. In effect, this interpretation relegates 
Operation Sealion4to nothing more than a sideshow. 
An undertaking of this size was hardly a sideshow. The postponement and then cancellation of 
Sealion was not a foregone conclusion, nor undertaken as an elaborate ruse. Invasion, while not 
Hitler's preferred solution, remained a viable option, that was actively considered, with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm, right up until postponement on 17 September 1940. This paper, by 
'H.R. Trevor-Roper. Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945, pgs.. 35-7.Sidgwick and 
Jackson, London: 1964. 
2Hjtler's War. Viking Press, New York: 1977. 
3"1940-1941: Britain's finest hour or Hitler's greatest hoax?" History ReView, March 
1997, 027, p33(5). 
4The popular name for the proposed Invasion of England by the Germans is usually given 
in English as "Operation Sea Lion" or "Operation Sealion". For the purpose of this paper, one 
term, "Sealion", will be used- author. 
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reviewing the planning for the invasion, the Luftwaffe's failed campaign against the RAF, and 
selected historiography interpreting Hitler's intent in postponing the operation, will suggest that 
the decisions that dictated the end of Sealion were not predetermined solely by Hitler's 
preoccupation with the Soviet Union, nor by concerns that the invasion might fail, but rather by a 
combination offactors, that, in Hitler's mind, made the scuttling of Sealion the best decision at 
the time. 
Section I· Plannjng Perce.ption and Acrimony 
One reason that the invasion was probably never executed was that the Germans were 
unprepared to undertake such an operationS, and once the decision was made to do so, the 
planning was flawed. A combination of a lack of foresight, perceptual differences as to objectives, 
and personal acrimony between individuals representing the different branches of the German 
military all served to exacerbate the process. Although both the Army and Navy had undertaken 
feasibility studies of an invasion as early as November of 1939, no men or material had been 
prepared for an attack across the Channel. As late as 4 June, considering the war won, the OKW 
(Wehrmacht High Command, or High Command of the German Armed Forces) was planning to 
reduce the size of the Army, and suggested that the industrial resources ofGermany be converted 
to the production of bombers for the Luftwaffe and submarines for the Navy. However, the 
SThe British were not ready to defend against an invasion either. Two months would 
elapse between the fall of France and the target date for the execution of Sealion, time the British 
would use to resupply and prepare defensive fortifications in the prospective invasion areas. For 
more information on the consequences of the German lack of preparedness to attack, see Peter 
Fleming's Inyasion 1940· An account of the Gennan pre.parations and the British counter­
measures Rupert Hart-Davis, London: 1957. 
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successful evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk" under extraordinary circumstances seems to have 
fired the imagination of the planning sections of the OKW. As General von Lossberg, then a 
Colonel on JodI's staff wrote: 
As our troops stood around Calais after the 
victory...they saw before them the chalk cliffs 
ofDover on the other side of the Channel. 
In the exaltation of the past success these 
German soldiers and their leaders, came to 
believe themselves capable of things that no 
one even dared to think of before the West 
Offensive. Thus, more out of the mood at 
the front than from the sober evaluation of 
the Armed Forces Leadership, the thought 
was born to land in England.1 
The Navy had a far more sober view ofsuch an undertaking. The German Admiralty had "...a 
hearty respect for the British Fleet and understood fully the difficulties of so extensive an 
amphibious operation.,,8 In a report to the Fuhrer dated II July 1940, Admiral Raeder, 
Commander in Chiefof the Navy, considered "that an invasion should be used as a last resort to 
force Britain to sue for peace", suggesting instead that England be dealt with by a combination of 
Naval blockade and air attacks.9 
Raeder's reluctance was due in no small part to his realization that in order to get an invasion 
"For an excellent source on the evacuation, see Richard Collier's The Sands ofDunkirk. 
E.P. Dutton, New York: 1966. 
1Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, pg 115. Duke University Press, Durham: 1960. 
8Hanson Baldwin, Battles Won and Lost· Great Campaigns of World War II, pg 35. 
Harper & Row, New York: 1966. 
9puehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, pg 114. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis: 1990. 
Includes minutes of the conferences as well as directives issued by Hitler. Fuhrer Directive no. 16 
and the Navy's reaction can be found starting on page 116. 
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force across the Channel and deployed on the beach, he would have to rely on the ability of the 
Luftwaffe to maintain air superiority during the operation. His relationship with Goring, head of 
the Luftwaffe, was never warm, and deteriorated rapidly after Goring's criticisms of the Navy's 
shortcomings during operations at Norway. Raeder knew all too well Goring's penchant for 
promising what the Luftwaffe could not deliver. Most recently, Goring had convinced Hitler to let 
the Luftwaffe finish off the British and French troops in the Dunkirk pocket, only to see over 
200,000 troops escape. Taking into account the scope of the operation, strength of the 
opposition, and Goring's mercurial nature, Raeder's frank assessment was that the Luftwaffe 
would be unable to provide the protection necessary to cross the Channel. 10 
The importance of the Luftwaffe creating the necessary conditions for a successful invasion 
were spelled out in Fuhrer Directive no. 16: "The British Air Force must be eliminated to such an 
extent that it will be incapable of putting up any substantial opposition to the invading troops.'>ll 
Goring and his Luftwaffe, despite having numerical superiority, were ill-prepared in June of 1940 
for such a role. The Air Force had been developed in a manner suited to the offensive support of 
ground troops, not for air combat or support oflandings by sea. Although the Luftwaffe had done 
l"walter Ansel, in particular, postulates that this acrimony between Raeder and Goring 
pushed Raeder into insisting upon the destruction of the RA.F., not just the maintaining ofair 
superiority over the invasion force, knowing that Goring would fail, in an attempt to discredit 
him. Whatever the motive, by feigning support for such an undertaking, Raeder was successful in 
contributing to the escalation of the Luftwaffe's role, a decision that need not have been made, 
and possibly contributed to the decision to eventually cancel the Invasion. 
"Richard Collier, Eagle Day-The Battle OfBritain, pg. 10. E.P. Dutton, New York: 1966. 
Collier provides some insight into Goring's nature- his overconfidence, vanity, and inattention to 
detail, that will manifest themselves throughout the war, leading him to continually promise to 
Hitler that the Luftwaffe will deliver when it cannot. The Battle ofBritain and subsequent 
bombing campaign against London are prime examples of this tendency. 
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a superlative job over Norway, an operation ofthis scope had never been attempted by a modem 
air force. 12 The medium-ranged bombers would not be able to reach potential invasion sites in 
England in force without redeployment to captured airfields in France. Fighter effectiveness over 
the Channel would be similarly hampered by range, allowing limited time for combat before 
having to return to base. Despite these obstacles, a credible plan of action was created by 
Goring's staff 13 Unfortunately, the plan would be changed by Goring once underway, and would 
compromise the chances for the success of the invasion as a result. 
Thus, the planning for the invasion was hampered in several important ways. There existed no 
viable contingency plan for a rapid invasion across the Channel in June of 1940. The three 
branches of the German military lacked the proper resources for such an undertaking. The 
industrial base of Germany was not producing the right kind of materials for an invasion, and it 
was in fact preparing to gear down the production to primarily defensive weapons. All three 
branches had a different perception of the invasion. The Army meant to invade at all costs. The 
Navy preferred siege rather than invasion, and entered into preparations with great reluctance. 
The key to creating the conditions that presented the best chance for success was that the 
Luftwaffe be able to control the skies over both the Channel and the invasion areas, an 
undertaking that, in order to be successful, would have to be executed exactly to plan. The result 
was that an operation, ambitious in scope and created in all due haste, would have its only chance 
for success if one branch of the military, the Luftwaffe, was able to carry out their role in the 
''For more information on the Luftwaffe's role in Norway, see Denis Richards' Royal Air 
Force 1939-1945. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London: 1953. 
13Adlerangriff, or 'Attack of the Eagles'. 
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undertaking flawlessly. 
Section II: From Alderall'gi(fto 'The Bljtz' 
Whatever Hitler's intent, most historians agree that any chance for executing the invasion as 
planned was contingent on the Luftwaffe fulfilling its proscribed mission. Goring had to defeat the 
RAF for the invasion to proceed. Goring's overconfidence in how quickly his operational plan 
could be carried out led, in part, to his decision to abandon the plan altogether at a crucial 
moment. In fact, the objective was within reach when Goring set aside the plan for an alternative 
approach that, if successful, would make invasion unnecessary. 
Fuhrer Directive l\o. 16 had decreed that the primary responsibility of the Luftwaffe was the 
elimination ofany air threat to the invasion. The Luftwaffe plan, Alderangriff(The Attack of the 
Eagles), met this requirement. The attack plan had two components. Alder Tag (Eagle Day), was 
designed to destroy airfields, ports, and factories crucial to aircraft construction across the 
invasion zone. The follow up operation, Lichtmeer (Sea of Light), a series of mass raids, would 
destroy any operational RAF bases remaining after the first attack. In addition, particular 
emphasis would be given to key targets such as the radio direction-finding stations on the coast, 
and major RAF airfields lying inland from the invasion zone. As final preparations were made to 
implement the plan, Goring was adamant that the operation would take no more than 4 days, an 
extremely ambitious and unrealistic assessment. i4 
It became immediately apparent that the operation was going to take more than 4 days. The 
campaign encountered problems from the very beginning. The weather, always unpredictable over 
the Channel and England even in summer, refused to cooperate. The first attack, scheduled for 
"Ibid, pgs.. 11-12 
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August 13th, was canceled, only some units did not get the order and attacked anyway. August 
14th went better, but some key targets were missed. Sorties scheduled for the 15th were canceled, 
while Goring conferred with his staff, only to be rescheduled at the last moment when the weather 
suddenly cleared. As the operation fell further behind, German losses remained high, but the 
Luftwaffe was accomplishing their primary objective- by August 21 st, the RAF had lost so many 
pilots that it slashed flight training for new recruits, from one month down to two weeks. By the 
27th, pilot losses were exceeding replacements by a ratio of almost 2: 1. IS As August turned to 
September, RAF Air Marshall Dowding estimated that he had only 746 serviceable aircraft left, 
and predicted his forces would be able to last for perhaps three more weeks.•" 
Goring did not realize how close he was to victory. It was at this crucial moment, some ten 
days before the final decision to invade was to be made, that he deviated from the Luftwaffe's 
operational plan. In reprisal for a series of RAF raids on Berlin, an angry Hitler ordered on 4 
September that London was to be attacked. Goring and Hitler became seized by the idea that 
England could be bombed into quittingn After conferring with his officers, Goring changed the 
mission of the Luftwaffe. Instead of diverting some units to the bombing of London while 
continuing to carry out the plan to destroy the RAF, the Luftwaffe would make this new mission 
its primary purpose. The bombers would be removed from their mission ofattacking invasion 
targets, and would instead be used for massive attacks against the English capitol. Perhaps most 
ISIbid, pg. 147 
I"Ibid pgs.. 166-168 
"Anthony Martienssen. Hitler And His Admirals, pg. 86. E.P. Dutton, New York: 1949. 
Martinson states that Hitler and Goring became convinced that a large scale attack on London 
would possibly be decisive, and make the invasion unnecessary. 
18 
9
 
importantly, the fighters were diverted from shooting down the British fighters to protecting the 
bombers. Although Seation would be postponed, it was effectively dead from this moment on. 
Without elimination ofany possibility of threat to Seation from the air, the chances for a 
successful invasion diminished to an unacceptable level. The failure of the Luftwaffe to complete 
the task of destroying the RAF meant that the conditions set down by Hitler for invasion were not 
met. Goring's overconfidence in the Luftwaffe's ability to quickly win the air battle, and growing 
impatience with the increasing delay caused him to meddle with tactics, change wing 
commanders, and make increasingly unreasonable demands, as his 4 day operation stretched into 
weeks. Frustrated, Goring would seize upon Hitler's order that London be bombed as an 
alternative method of bringing the war against Britain to a quick solution, and tum away from the 
destruction of the RAF, when success was still well within his reach. With this last minute respite, 
the RAF gained valuable time to bring pilot strength back up to acceptable levels and rebuild its 
squadrons. Although postponed, not canceled, Sealion was no longer a viable option without 
major changes in its operational parameters. With the RAF having time to rebuild, and the onset 
ofFall and inclement weather, the opportunity for the best chance of success had passed. 19 
18Ibid, pgs.. 86-90. Martinson offers more details of this "bombing fever" that overtook 
Hitler and Goring at this crucial juncture, as well as the Navy's opinions of events. The Admiralty 
was more than willing to support this change of tactics, particularly since it might preclude the 
necessity of putting their ships at risk. 
l~or a detailed account of the Battle ofBritain and bombing campaign against London 
from the British perspective, see Denis Richards' Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Her Majesty's 
Stationary Office, London: 1953. For an in-depth look at the decisions relating to the change in 
tactics and ultimate postponement of Sealion from the perspective of Hitler's Chief of the General 
Staff, see The Halder Diaries. Charles Burdick and Hans-AdolfJacobsen editors. Presidio Press, 
Novato, CA: 1988. 
10
 
Section Ill· Alternate Explanations and Consequences 
Historical debate about Sealion usually focuses on the issue ofHitler's intent, primarily 
whether Hitler ever intended to invade. It is clear he did not wish to, but the British were not 
being cooperative. By the end ofMay of 1940, Hitler was in the grip ofa "victory psychosis"20, 
carried away with triumph and relief, wholly expectant that he would be able to dictate terms to 
England as well as France. When England did not respond as he expected, Hitler ordered that 
preparations for an invasion be made, despite the fact that he had been "...fundamentally reluctant 
to carry out such an operation"21 
The issue ofHitler's intent was unclear even among his senior officers. Hitler "...roundly 
rejected invasion" as an alternative on May 20th. On June 3rd, he tells his Intelligence Chief 
Canaris and Admiral Raeder that the war is "...already won". Later, General Jodi is under the 
impression that the invasion will be carried out as "...a last resort", only if Britain refuses to 
negotiate. 22 Historians are quick to point out that Hitler was, by nature, a continentalist; tending 
to see the war from a European point ofview. Hitler's arch-enemies were France and Russia, not 
England.23 War Directives after the summer of 1940 make little or no mention of reanimating 
2"David Irving, Hitler's War pg. 118. Viking Press, New York: 1977. 
21Siegfried Westphal, 'The War Spreads', pg. 29. The Fatal Decisions. Friedin, Sidney and 
William Richardson, editors. William Sloane Associates, New York: 1956. Westphal served with 
the Luftwaffe during the air campaign against Britain. He observes that despite a preference to 
avoid amphibious warfare, Hitler would have given the order to proceed with the invasion, if the 
Luftwaffe had not failed in their mission to destroy the RAF. 
22pavid Irving, pgs. 118, 125, 133, 134. 
23Egbert Kieser, Hitler On The Doorstep Operation 'Sea Lion' The German Plan to 
Inyade Britain 1940, pgs.. 266-267. Translated by Helmut Bogler. Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis: 1987. 
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Sealion, instead showing that Hitler had turned his attention to furthering Gennan ambitions on 
the continent.24 Chief among these ambitions at the moment was getting Spain into the war on 
the Axis side. 2S 
Still, these explanations do not take into account Hitler's adaptability, or the fact that, like all 
Gennans of his generation, Hitler remembered all too well the consequences for Gennany in 
World War I, when it found itself fighting a two-front war.26 It can be postulated that Hitler did 
intend to invade. He ordered Sealion as an option, with the intention of carrying it out, if the 
circumstances were right. When Britain would not negotiate after the fall ofFrance, Hitler 
"...seriously meant to embark on an invasion", and only turned away when the Luftwaffe did not 
achieve the results necessary within the time frame necessary for the operation to be successful. 21 
A continuance of the bombing ofBritish cities, and a blockade by the V-Boats of the Navy would 
bring Britain to bargain for peace. Meanwhile, Hitler would pursue Operation Felix, the seizure of 
Gibraltar, to bring the threat ofloss of Empire into the equation. As was his wont to do, Hitler 
24H.R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945. Sidgwick and Jackson, London: 
1964. Directives 17-19 shows this progression. Directive no. 17, dated 1 August 1940, still 
exclusively deal with invasion plans. By Directive no. 18, Hitler's attention has turned to other 
matters. 
25Hitler wanted Spain's help in seizing the British base at Gibraltar, a plan, that if 
successful, would have changed the nature of the war in the Mediterranean, as well as posed a 
vital threat to British interests throughout the Empire. For a excellent analysis of the relationship 
between Hitler and Franco, as well as the potential consequences of Spain entering the war 
actively, see Donald S. Detwiler's "Spain and the Axis during World War II." The Review of 
Politics, vol.33, no. 1, January, 1971. University ofNotre Dame Press, Notre Dame: 1971. 
26With good reason, as events would show- author. 
21Ronald Wheatly, Operation Sea Lion' Gennan Plans For The Invasion Of England 1939­
.l.212. Claredon Press, Oxford: 1958. 
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pursued multiple objectives at once. 
This does not mean that there weren't significant advantages to preparing for an invasion, and 
then maintaining the illusion that it would be carried out after it has been postponed. The British 
took the threat of invasion quite seriously, spending valuable resources to defend against it when 
it came. 28 In the summer of 1940, Hitler no doubt felt that the threat ofinvasion might bring the 
British to their senses. 29 By continuing the facade of invasion after postponement, the Germans 
might be able lull Stalin into thinking they intended to continue honoring their pact with him'o 
Such thinking, that an operation had psychological ramifications as well as tactical ones, would 
not be uncommon for Hitler.31 
Section IV' Conclusjon 
It was the operational difficulties in executing Sealion that caused Hitler to postpone the 
operation, not an intent to stage preparations for an invasion for psychological purposes only. 
Hitler had been caught by surprise several times in the summer of 1940, first by the degree of the 
triumph over France, and again by the resolve of the British, whom he wholly expected to come 
2'For an overview ofthe possibility ofinvasion and defensive preparation from the British 
perspective, see Chapters 10 and II of Sir Winston Churchill's Memoirs Of The Second World 
War. Houghton Mifflin, Riverside Press, Cambridge: 1959. 
29J}avid Irving, pg. 143. 
30Christopher Ray, "1940-1941: Britain's finest hour or Hitler's greatest hoax?" His/ory 
Review, March 1997, no.27, p33-5. 
311t is worth noting that the citations used in this paragraph, from the works ofDavid 
Irving and Christopher Ray, are part of a larger works, both advocating that the primary reason 
for Hitler ordering Sealion was for political effect and propaganda purposes. I have chosen, in this 
work, to invert the priority they assign to these purposes, suggesting rather that they were 
bonuses in preparing for the invasion, rather than the reason for it- author. 
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to tenns. Once convinced that the British were not going to see reason, Hitler ordered 
preparations for the invasion, setting the tentative date for the operation to begin in early 
September. 
The planning for the operation was hampered by a combination of lack ofpreparedness, 
acrimony between Raeder and Goring, and differing degrees of enthusiasm between the branches 
of the military. Nonetheless, a viable plan was created, one whose best chance of success was 
predicated on the ability of the Luftwaffe to nullity any threat to the operation by the RAF. 
The Luftwaffe did not achieve its objective. As Goring's 4 day operation turned into weeks, he 
became increasingly fiustrated, and interfered with his operations staffby replacing commanders 
and changing tactics. Embarrassed by his failure to defeat the RAF and running the threat of 
upsetting the invasion timetable, Goring abandoned the campaign when Hitler ordered a reprisal 
raid against London for air raids against Berlin. Hitler postponed the invasion shortly thereafter. 
Hitler simply ran out of time. Knowing he could not leave an enemy behind him if he was to 
pursue his ambitions on the continent, he had hoped that Britain would come to tenns in the 
summer of 1940. When the British refused to negotiate, Hitler pursued the option of invasion. As 
the summer waned and the Luftwaffe had still not accomplished its mission, the possibility that the 
invasion might be executed before the onset of inclement weather diminished to the point that 
Hitler chose to postpone Sealion and use alternative methods to make Britain quit. The 
appearance of invasion preparedness would be kept up another year, to both lull the Soviet Union 
and bring pressure on the British to negotiate. 
Hitler never understood why Britain would not come to tenns. The consequences of his 
decision to bomb and blockade rather than invade are well known. Rather than be cowed into 
14
 
quitting, British morale soared during the Blitz. The U-Boat campaign against British shipping 
significantly diminished Britain's ability to fight, but brought America into a more active role in 
support of Britain. After America joined the war on the British side, the British Isles became a 
major marshaling point for Overlord, the invasion of Europe by the Allies in 1944. By abandoning 
the invasion, an option that if successful would have eliminated Britain as a combatant, for a 
campaign of attrition, Hitler made a grave error, one that would have serious consequences on the 
outcome of the war. 
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